No fewer than three important opinions were handed down today, with the Supreme Court siding on the side of Truth, Justice, and the American Way in two of them and wussing out in a third.

Hamdi, et al. v. Rumsfeld, et al. dealt with a U.S. citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was captured in with the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, and labeled an "enemy combatant." Hamdi had languished in a navy brig since then and was suing to contest his "enemy combatant" status, alleging that, as a U.S. citizen, he has the right to a trial to contest the charges against him. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision, holding that

express congressional authorization of the detention was required by 18 U. S. C. §4001(a) -- which provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress" -- the [Authorization for Use of Military Force]'s "necessary and appropriate force" language provided the authorization for Hamdi's detention. It also concluded that Hamdi is entitled only to a limited judicial inquiry into his detention's legality under the war powers of the political branches, and not to a searching review of the factual determinations underlying his seizure.

The Authorization for Use of Military Force was passed by Congress in 2001, authorizing the President to "'use all necessary and appropriate force'" against "'against "nations, organizations, or persons'" that he determines "'planned, authorized, committed, or aided'" in the September 11 attacks. The government had insisted that its right to deny Hamdi the right to contest his charges was consistent with "necessary and appropriate force."

Well, the Supreme Court didn't think so. In a very split decision, it concluded that "due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker." The decision was 6-3, with only Scalia, Thomas, and Stevens dissenting, although Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and concurring with the judgment, which Justice Ginsburg also signed.

One of the issues that perplexed the justices in the oral arguments was the meaning of "enemy combatant." At the time, one of the justices quipped, "Well, it's an English word. It means somebody who is combatting." Funny stuff, for sure (maybe they should take that act on the road), but hardly funny enough for the law. Writing the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor notes that "[t]here is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such."

More importantly, the Court considered the implication of Hamdi's possible perpetual imprisonment:

As the Government concedes, "given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire agreement." Ibid. The prospect Hamdi raises is therefore not far-fetched. If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi's detention could last for the rest of his life.

The majority opinion also delved into the realm of absolute government power, as exemplified by the government's summary denial that facts of the case are undisputed, when in fact, they are: "Moreover, as critical as the Government's interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat."

O'Connor finally concludes, "We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. [. . .] In so holding, we necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government."

Score one for the Constitution: the executive cannot hold U.S. citizens and deny them habeus corpus.

The next opinion released was for Rasul, et al. v. Bush, et al.. This is the case of Guantanamo Bay detainees who want to contest their status as enemy combatants. Unlike Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, these people are acknowledged as not U.S. citizens; nonetheless, they are seeking relief under U.S. habeus law, which authorizes district courts "to entertain habeas applications by persons claiming to be held "in custody in violation of the ... laws ... of the United States," §§2241(a), (c)(3)" (ellipses in original).

One of the government's primary arguments in the case was that no U.S. court had jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, since it was on sovereign Cuban soil. John Gibbons, arguing for Rasul, insisted that "Cuban law has never had any application inside that base. A stamp with Fidel Castro's picture on it wouldn't get a letter off the base." The justices also agreed that when the lease says that "the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas" (the "said areas" being Guantanamo Bay), it means that U.S. law applies within those areas.

The government's second argument is that, pursuant to the decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, a case involving German prisoners taken by U.S. authorities on foreign soil during WWII, the petitioners have no standing to bring a case questioning their status as "enemy combatants." The justices didn't believe this, either. Justice Stevens, writing the opinion of the court, noted these differences:

Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.

The nationalities of the people in question are Australian and Israeli. Unless the "War on Terror" is encompassing bomb-laden wallabies.

That's two for the Constitution. The third important opinion released today deals with Rumsfeld v. Padilla, et al. Padilla, you'll recall, was a U.S. citizen captured on U.S. soil and thought to be involved in the production of a "dirty bomb." He was held in a navy brig as an "enemy combatant" without the ability to contest that status.

The 5-4 majority concluded that the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Southern District),where the case was filed, did not have jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense, who was named respondent in the case. Nor did it have jurisdiction over Padilla's habeas petition. The "proper respondent," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, was Padilla's "custodian," the person who exercised control over him. This person would have been Melanie A. Marr, Commander of the Consolidated Naval Brig, where Padilla was held. Though the habeas statute plainly requires that the respondent be the "immediate custodian" of the person involved, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Rumsfeld, as Secretary of Defense, had the "legal reality of control" over Padilla. Not so, says Rehnquist: the clause of "legal control" only comes into play when there is no immediate, identifiable custodian. In this case, there is, and it is Commander Marr, not Rumsfeld. Rehnquist also denied that the Southern District was the correct place to bring his habeas petition; rather, it should have been the District of South Carolina.

Rehnquist's opinion in this case is consistent with his ruling in Rasul v. Bush, where he concurred with Scalia in that no one had jurisdiction to hear the Guantanamo detainees' request for habeas corpus, since the law requires a habeas request to be filed in the court of the jurisdiction of the place where the prisoner is being held.

That's two for the Constitution and one for President Bush. At least the Constitution is still on top.