Okay, so making fun of Italian accents is probably inappropriate when discussing President Bush's new Supreme Court nominee, Samuel A. Alito, Jr. But you know what? I like hurtful stereotypes. And you know what else? As an Italian Catholic, Alito will no doubt let the Pope control the court, just like John F. Kennedy let the Pope control the nation while Kennedy was president.

Unlike his predecessor, Harriet Miers, Judge Alito passes the "minimum requirements" test required for a Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court were Windows XP, then Harriet Miers would have been a Pentium III, 500 MHz machine with 128 MB of RAM and a 5 GB hard drive. Clearly, she would have had problems running Windows XP. Now, Alito is more like a Pentium 4, 1 GHz machine with 256 MB of RAM and a 40 GB hard drive. Okay, he can run Windows XP. We don't have to worry about meeting the minimum requirements. Alito's record is, thankfully, long and boring:

• 1972: Earned B.A. from Princeton University
• 1975: Earned J.D. from Yale Law School
• 1976-1977: Law Clerk for Third Circuit Court Judge Leonard Garth
• 1977-1981: Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey
• 1981-1985: Assistant to Solicitor General Rex E. Lee
• 1985-1987: Deputy Assistant to Attorney General Edwin Meese
• 1987-1990: U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey
• 1990-2005: Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• 2002-2005: Adjunct Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law

Even though he meets the minimum requirements, in our little analogy, Alito would be an HP computer.

Yes, like all computers manufactured by HP or Compaq, Alito has a fatal flaw. In the case of HP's computers, they were assembled by blind monkeys. In the case of Alito, he doesn't like abortion so much, which is just what the evangelical Protestants that make up Bush's religious base wanted. (The monkeys, on the other hand, were hoping for a justice who would uphold monkey labor rights and give them some medical marijuana for their glaucoma.)

The big stink being made about Alito revolves around an opinion he wrote in 1991 as a judge with the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which serves Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The case in question is called Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682. In that case, the Third Circuit Court was asked to decide whether amendments to Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of 1982 were unconstitutional. A U.S. District Court found sections requiring informed consent, parental consent, spousal notice, reporting requirements, and public disclosure of abortion clinics' reports to be unconstitutional. The Third Circuit Court reversed all of these decisions, except one, holding that only the spousal notice section -- section 3209 -- was unconstitutional. When the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 [1992]), it affirmed the Third Circuit Court's decision that "husband notification provision constitutes an undue burden, and is therefore invalid."

Judge Alito concurred in part and dissented in part. He did not agree with the court's conclusion that husband notification was unconstitutional because it imposed an "undue burden" upon the woman, that burden not serving a "compelling state interest." Did he go the extra step of suggesting that a woman should not only notify her husband about an abortion, but get approval from her husband before obtaining an abortion? I can't find that anywhere in the text of the decision. All that Alito has to say about husband notification is that he can't see any reason why it's a bad idea:

The Pennsylvania legislature could have rationally believed that some married women are initially inclined to obtain an abortion without their husbands' knowledge because of perceived problems - such as economic constraints, future plans, or the husbands' previously expressed opposition -- that may be obviated by discussion prior to the abortion. In addition, the legislature could have reasonably concluded that Section 3209 would lead to such discussion and thereby properly further a husband's interests in the fetus in a sufficient percentage of the affected cases to justify enactment of this measure. Although the plaintiffs and supporting amici argue that Section 3209 will do little if any good and will produce appreciable adverse effects, the Pennsylvania legislature presumably decided that the law on balance would be beneficial.

Again, I stress that nowhere in the text of Alito's dissenting opinion could I find anything that might construe that he believes husbands should have the authority to veto a woman's choice to have an abortion. Of course, I've been wrong in the past.

Alito does not believe that suggestions that women would not tell their husbands about an abortion for fear of abuse are compelling, since the plaintiffs in the case did not provide statistics detailing how many women might be abused:

Second, the plaintiffs offered testimony that the exceptions in Section 3209 would not cover a case in which a woman did not want to notify her husband for fear that he would retaliate in some way other than the infliction of bodily injury upon her, such as by subjecting her to psychological abuse or abusing their children (see 744 F. Supp. at 1360-62). The plaintiffs, however, do not appear to have offered any evidence showing how many (or indeed that any actual women) would be affected by this asserted imperfection in the statute.

Third, the plaintiffs introduced general evidence about the problem of spouse abuse (see 744 F. Supp. at 1361). They offered widely varying statistics concerning the dimensions of the problem, as well as evidence that battering occurs in all socioeconomic groups and is sometimes fatal. This proof, while documenting the existence of a broad national problem, provides no basis for any estimate of what is relevant here -- the impact of Section 3209.

Fourth, the plaintiffs offered evidence that "mere notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering" (see 744 F. Supp. at 1361). This proof indicates when violence is likely to occur in an abusive marriage but provides no basis for determining how many women would be adversely affected by Section 3209. Finally, the plaintiffs offered the opinion of one of their witnesses that most battered women would be psychologically incapable of taking advantage of Section 3209's fourth exception, i.e., the exception for cases in which the woman has reason to fear that notification will lead to the infliction of bodily harm upon her (see 744 F. Supp. at 1363). However, the plaintiffs failed to show how many of the women potentially affected by Section 3209 (married women seeking abortions without notifying their husbands) are victims of battering. Thus, the opinion offered by their expert, even if taken at face value, merely describes the likely behavior of most of the women in a group of unknown size. Clearly, then, this evidence does not show how many women would be inhibited or otherwise harmed by Section 3209. I cannot believe that a state statute may be held facially unconstitutional simply because one expert testifies that in her opinion the provision would harm a completely unknown number of women.

Since the plaintiffs provided no hard facts that a woman might be battered, Alito concludes that the testimony of one witness is not good enough to invalidate section 3209.

He believes that a husband has a "fundamental" and "legitimate" interest in the fetus and that the husband should be involved in the decision-making process, but he stops short of saying that husbands should have veto power over a woman's abortion; indeed, he acknowledges prior case law that held "that a potential father may not be given the legal authority to veto an abortion" (cf. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 [1976]).

Alito's opinions in other areas aren't so radical: he held that a school that failed to prevent a student from being bullied because of his "lack of athleticism and perceived sexual orientation" was liable for that bullying. He struck down a school district anti-harrassment policy that regulated vulgar speech or school-sponsored speech that was not threatening or disruptive. But I believe that abortion is the reason that Bush nominated him. John Roberts was a failure for the Christian conservatives, since he wasn't as conservative as they thought. After Roberts, the religious base wanted 100% certainty that the next nominee would re-illegalize abortion. Harriet Miers was a failure because she had no judicial track record to go on. The assertions of advisors behind closed doors that she would overturn Roe v. Wade were not assuring enough to the religious right. Alito is their man: he has a definitive track record of ruling against abortion. He's a one-trick pony. He's quite conservative, in the mold of Scalia, and he will definitely push the court to the right, something that's not desirable at all.

For more on Alito's history, read SCOTUSblog's biography of him and his cases.