It's been quite a week for the Supreme Court. Last week, they released a ruling that everyone hated. Today, they're still releasing rulings that people hate. Let's have a look at the recent Supreme Court rulings!
MGM v. Grokster, 04-480
This is the big one that all the intellectual property people were waiting for. We had hoped that the Supreme Court would rule that Grokster, a file-sharing network, is not liable for the infringement committed by its users. Sadly, the Supreme Court (in a unanimous opinion!) ruled in favor of content providers. In its opinion (did I mention it was 9-0?!), the Court created a new standard of contributory infringement, holding that
One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device's lawful uses.
This new standard replaces the one set by Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), in which devices that can break the law are legal so long as they have "substantial non-infringing uses." Now, a distinction has been made between devices which have non-infringing uses and devices which were designed specifically to break the law.
File-sharing networks, while they engage in breaking the law by providing access to copyrighted materials, do engage in "substantial non-infringing uses." Many Linux distributions are distributed over file-sharing networks, as well as the work of independent musicians. The justices didn't seem to care for these uses, however, and chose to mandate that "evidence of intent to promote infringement" be a factor in determining contributory infringement.
Does this mean that every inventor must go out of his way to make sure that his invention can't break the law? Not really. Note the words "clear expression" and "affirmative steps" in the block citation above. Negligence is not an "affirmative" step toward copyright violation. Thus, if a use for an invention is discovered that breaks the law, and that use was not part of the original intent for the invention, then the inventor is not liable, since there is no "evidence of intent" to break the law. Nevertheless, this is a blow to file-sharing networks and any device which can easily move information around. While it's not as bad as it sounds, it gives added moral support to content providers' quest to destroy file sharing.
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 03-1693
McCreary County, Kentucky decided to display the Ten Commandments in its courthouses. The county's argument was that the display was totally secular -- honest! -- and that the Ten Commandments are part of the history of the law. The Court didn't buy this argument, citing the case Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which establishes a test to determine whether or not the government breaks the Establishment Clause with its actions. The Lemon test evaluates the "secular legislative purpose" of a religious action. McCreary County argued that the Lemon test should be thrown to the wayside in this case, since "true 'purpose' is unknowable, and its search merely an excuse for courts to act selectively and unpredictably in picking out evidence of subjective intent." The majority didn't buy this for a second, calling McCreary County's arguments "as seismic as they are unconvincing." The Court found that McCreary County acted without a "secular legislative purpose."
The decision was 6-3, with Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting. Of course, Scalia brought in his usual garbage about cultural heritage and Western tradition, which are perfectly permissible as law, even though contemporary international cultural norms and court opinions are not. These three are the most conservative justices, so their being on the opposing side makes sense. What's important is that the swing people -- O'Connor and Kennedy -- were on the majority side. That means that this was a good ruling.
Van Orden v. Perry, 03-1500
The Court actually dealt with two Ten Commandments cases. The second, Van Orden v. Perry, was similar. The Texas State Capitol contained 21 historical markers and 17 monuments, among them "a 6-foot high monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments." A District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court held that the display did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court agreed in a very divisive 5-4 ruling. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, but Thomas and Scalia filed concurring opinions, meaning they agreed with the outcome but had different methods of getting to that outcome. Breyer also filed a concurring opinion. Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, meaning he disagreed with the judgment, and O'Connor filed a separate dissenting opinion which Stevens and Ginsburg signed on to. Holy cow! Ultimately, the Court concluded that this display was permissible because the Ten Commandments were included in the context of "a broader moral and historical message reflective of cultural heritage." Another good, if schizophrenic, ruling.
Kelo v. New London, 04-108
This opinion makes me cry. Petitioner Kelo is a woman who owns a house in New London, Conn. New London wanted to use its right of eminent domain to take Kelo's house and hand it over to a private developer. The city justified this by saying that the increased tax revenue and new jobs generated by the private developer's improvement of the land is a "public use" as specified in the Fifth Amendment, which forbids the seizure of private land by the government unless the land is set aside for "public use." Until now, such a use has been pretty overt: a park, a highway, something everyone can use. But now, the Supreme Court has endorsed the time-honored practice of municipalities taking public land and handing it over to private developers. Municipalities -- cities and towns -- are some of the most corrupt governmental institutions. There are hundreds of examples all over the country of towns and cities taking private land with the promise of "public use" and handing the land over to a private developer so that developer can build a store or a parking lot. This practice has been questioned, but now it has been rendered valid by the Supreme Court, which was clearly high at the time they wrote the majority opinion.
John Paul Stevens, who is about a thousand years old and is out of touch with reality as we know it, wrote the majority opinion, which displeased conservatives and liberals alike. Seriously: no one likes this opinion!
Sandra Day O'Connor, writing the dissenting opinion, was extremely eloquent. She and the others who dissented -- Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas -- were very concerned that the majority had redefined "public use" to mean practically anything:
In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But nearly any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitutional, then the words “for public use” do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.
The nebulous promise of increased tax revenue or more jobs, says O'Connor, is not specific enough to be defined as "public use." Clarence Thomas wrote his own dissenting opinion which, considering that it's Clarence Thomas, was very cogent and well-written. Thomas gives us a lesson in the etymology of the word "use," concluding that "use" requires that something be done with the land by the people. They have to be able to use it. People cannot use tax revenue or jobs. But the best part of Thomas's opinion is that he discusses how the writers of the Constitution used another phrase -- "general Welfare" -- to describe things which intangibly benefit the people:
Tellingly, the phrase “public use” contrasts with the very different phrase “general Welfare” used elsewhere in the Constitution. (“Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”); preamble (Constitution established “to promote the general Welfare”). The Framers would have used some such broader term if they had meant the Public Use Clause to have a similarly sweeping scope.
Good job, Clarence Thomas! He ends his dissent by calling the majority opinion what it is: "far-reaching and dangerous." For, as O'Connor says, if "public use" can mean any tiny, tiny benefit that may, someday, somewhere, in the nebulous future, be a benefit, then municipalities can turn land over to private corporations and pocket the profits, and municipalities are always concerned with increasing tax revenue.